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1 Introduction
There has been a growing interest in labor economics about the effect of macroeconomic
conditions on microeconomic outcomes. For example, recent studies have found a substan-
tial and long-lasting impact of recessions on employment, earnings and health outcomes of
workers. Yet, the effect of the business cycle on the selection of skill into sectors has not
been studied empirically because of the difficulty in measuring individual skills (see also
Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2009). In most sectors the observable output depends on the
input of several individuals, which makes the task of measuring individual productivity im-
possible to perform. One sector, however, where individual skills can be readily measured
via publication success is academic research.
In this paper, we study the impact of the business cycle at application and graduation
on the skill allocation in the academic labor market. This is done by relating the research
productivity of economists graduating from top 30 US universities to the change in the
unemployment rate during the last 50 years. We identify the causual effect of the business
cycle on the skill allocation because the overall unemployment rate is arguably exogenous
to the labor market for economists.
The results may help us to understand how quickly and how persistently the skill alloca-
tion responds to (temporary) changes in the relative attractiveness of knowledge intensive
sectors. For example, they shed light on the potential effect of the recent attractiveness of
the financial and consulting sector on the distribution of skilled individuals (e.g Philippon
and Reshef 2009). More directly, they provide evidence on the potential effectiveness of
some late initatives by the US Congress to increase R&D spending for basic research to
increase the supply of scientists (e.g. Goolsbee (1998) and Freeman and van Reenen (2009)).
We find that cohorts who applied for the PhD program during economically bad times
publish significantly better on average than boom cohorts. However, a significantly smaller
fraction of them is publishing at all. For example, during the first 10 years after gradua-
tion, the average PhD student admitted at the 90% quantile of increase in unemployment
rate (+1.8%) publishes the impact-equivalent of one single-authored ‘Economica’ article
more than the average PhD student admitted when unemplyoment change was at the 10%
quantile (-1.0%). The probability that the economist who applied in the recession publishes
at all is reduced by 2.9%, compared to an average of 36%. The effect at graduation has
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the same sign and magnitude for the average research productivity while the propensity to
publish appears unaltered by macroeconomic variation at graduation. In the following we
consider subsamples of graduates from tier 1 universities and a subsample of PhDs who have
at least one publication. In both groups the results become much stronger. Furthermore
we conduct extensive robustness checks which confirm our findings.
Taking our estimates literally, we expect the cohort of graduate students who applied
for the PhD during the recession of 2008 (3.46% increase in unemployment) to produce
on average 16 percent more publication output than a cohort applying in an average year
(0% unemployment change). On average they are however 3% less likely to publish at all.
Finally, we expect assistant professors who graduated during 2008 to be around 17 percent
more productive than assistant professors graduating in an average year.
To arrive at our results, we construct a new dataset of PhD cohorts’ publication success
from publicly available sources. The dataset consists of graduation years and degree grant-
ing universities of 13624 PhDs since 1955. We match each person with all their publications
available on JStor. Thus we can calculate the likelihood to publish and the average perfor-
mance for each economist. Finally, we aggregate each yearly cohort and match macroeco-
nomic conditions at application to the PhD and at graduation obtained from Datastream.
In the analysis we use standard OLS regressions to quantify the influence of labor market
conditions at application and at graduation on economists’ probability to publish and on
their productivity.
We interpret our two main results, the better average publication success and lower
propensity to publish of “recession economists”, in terms of a selection hypothesis: Suppose
every individual has a distinct skill for the private sector and for research. Undergraduate
students choose their sector of occupation according to their relative skill advantage and
their relative career prospects in these sectors. During recession the carreer prospects in
the private sector are reduced. This induces individuals with high private sector skill,
who would not have applied during a boom, to apply for PhD programs. Because the
number of places in graduate education is fixed, they then crowd out graduate students
with lower expected academic and private sector ability who would have taken the places in
a boom. After the five years of graduate program have passed, students can decide again if
they want to enter the private sector. “Recession economist” have a higher average private
sector ability and therefore leave academia by a larger proportion. This explains their lower
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propensity to publish. If a “recession economist”, who would have entered the private sector
in a boom, decides to stay in academia he outperforms his “boom collegues” because his
academic ability was higher in the first place. This explains the higher average publication
success of boom cohorts. Our reasoning is similar for cohorts of PhD economists who face
a recession at graduation. Given that the number of assistant professor positions does not
increase during recessions, we expect them on average to be of higher academic- as well as
private sector skill and thus to publish more successfully.
Our results are related to two ongoing research debates. First, we contribute to a
recent literature which analyzes the impact of the initial macroeconomic situation on mi-
croeconomic outcomes in the labor market. For example, Oreopoulos, Wachter, and Heisz
(2008) show that university graduates who enter the labor market during recessions ex-
perience substantial short-term earnings losses which fade only after 8-10 years, but that
more highly skilled graduates suffer less because they switch to better firms quickly.1 Our
study complements their findings by focusing on the composition of skills within sectors for
highly able individuals. In two related articles, Paul Oyer studies the effect of the first job
placement for highly skilled indiviuals by the example of MBAs (Oyer 2008) and economics
PhD graduates’ (Oyer 2006). In order to get exogenous variation, he instruments the first
placement using the state of the macroeconomy. He finds that, despite their potentially
higher job mobility, MBAs’ lifetime earnings and PhD graduates’ publication success are
substantially negatively affected by adverse macroeconomics conditions. Our results com-
plement his findings by showing that recessions also change the composition of applicants,
not only the compositions of job offers.
The second literature we contribute to is concerned with the determinants of scientific
productivity and their potential implications for policy makers.2 As mentioned above, our
study is most closely related to the papers that examine the impact of science funding
on research productivity. Funding increases, like recessions, raise the attractiveness of the
academic sector relative to the private sector. Goolsbee (1998) shows that up to 50% of
1In other articles, Till von Wachter and different coauthors examine the effect of recessions on
the long term employment, earnings and health outcomes of workers in the US and in Germany
(von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2008, Oreopoulos, Wachter, and Heisz 2008, Schmieder, von
Wachter, and Bender 2009, Sullivan and von Wachter 2009).
2Some recent studies have exploited exogenous shocks to cooperations between scientists in order
to better understand the importance of peer effects (e.g. Waldinger 2009, Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang
2008). Other studies suggest that new communication technologies have changed the production
and the dissemination of research (e.g. Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006, Ellison 2007).
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a spending increase goes into higher salaries for scientists and engineers. Suggesting that
the supply of such knowledge workers is relatively inelastic, he argues that a large fraction
of government research funding may in fact be ineffective and only constitute a windfall
gain for scientists. To the contrary, our results imply that, although the quantity does
not change, the quality of researchers should increase swiftly and substantially with more
funding. Along these lines, Freeman and van Reenen (2009) assert that, at least in the
long run, not only the number of scientists but also the selection of talent into science will
increase due to higher salaries.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes how we
assembled our novel dataset of PhD economists’ publication success. Section 3 analyzes
the effect of the labor market conditions at application and at graduation on the average
research success of PhD cohorts. This effect is separated into the probability to publish
and the publication success of those who do so in section 4. Section 5 interprets our results
in the context of the selection of skills into sectors and provides strong secondary evidence
that supports this interpretation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
To analyse the effect of macroeconomic variation on the research productivity of economists
we collect a new dataset of individual productivity for a large sample of economists in North
America from 1955 to 2004. We aggregate the individiduals to university year cohorts and
match these with the change in unemployment for the year of application and the year of
graduation.
2.1 Economist Sample Selection and Publication Data
We assemble a database of names, graduation years and PhD granting institutions of all
economists who graduated from North American Universities since 1955 from the American
Economic Association’s (AEA) yearly “List of Doctoral Dissertations in Economics”. This
annual list was published in the Papers and Proceedings issue of the “American Economic
Review” until 1986 and in the “Journal of Economic Literature” thereafter. Due to the sheer
amount of processed data we employed Optical Character Recognition (OCR) programs and
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regular expression to convert the data into a computer-readable format. In a next step,
we matched the information on PhD graduates to publication data from Jstor’s “Data
for Research” (DfR) database with the help of a Java program. Specifically, we entered
the names and given names of all researchers contained in our database and extracted all
recorded publications with journal title, page count and the number and identity of co-
authors in the 10 years after their graduation. To be as specific as possible, we restricted
our search to articles classfied as “research articles” and published in English language in
the fields of economics, business and finance.
The restriction to articles published ten years after graduation (as in Oyer 2006), has
three reasons: First, it improves the specifity of the data processing, because economists
with the same name who were born in different decades are not matched but kept as
different persons. Second, the quality of an economist is arguably best revealed in the first
decade after PhD graduation. Academic researchers are highly motivated (incentivized) in
this period because their tenure decision depends on the publication record of these first
years. Finally, graduates from more recent years would be disadvantaged if we would not
restrict the timeframe. Currently Jstor provides full publication data up to the year 2004,
so the last individuals we can rightfully analyse using our ten year requirement are those
who graduated in 1994.
One drawback of our study is that our recorded publications only entail articles in
journals that are listed in JStor. Most noteably, it leaves out Elsevier publications such
as the “Journal of Econometrics”, the “Journal of Monetary Economics” or the “Journal
of Financial Economics”. Because we do not believe that either recession or boom cohorts
systematically prefer or dislike Elsevier journals, this should be of no issue. In total we use
74 journals including all other major publications in economics and finance. For a list and
ranking of the first 40 please refer to table 12. For a detailed discussion of our automated
data processing method please refer to Appendix A. In a last step we supplemented the
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information with the respective tier of the degree granting university according to the NSF.3
2.2 Data Processing: Research Productivity, Subsamples &
Aggregation
To be able to compare the oeuvre of different economists over time, we calculate a consistent
measure of productivity for all researcher in our sample. We multiply each publication of an
author by its weight according to a dynamic journal ranking and divide it by the number
of coauthors of the paper. We then sum up all these contributions within ten years of
graduating from the PhD to obtain a productivity measure for every individual in our
sample.
Comparing the value of publications over the decades is difficult because the relative im-
pact of economics journals has changed substantially over time (Kim, Morse, and Zingales
(2006)). To account for this, we use for each journal in each decade a specifically calculated
relative weight assembled from various sources: For the 1960s through the 1980s we use
the ranking from Laband and Piette (1994). For the 1990s and 2000s we use the equiva-
lent ranking published in Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and Stengos (2003) and the recursive
discounted ranking pubblished on the "ideas" webpage respectively.4 For the 1950s we were
not able to find a journal ranking and thus decided to extrapolate our 1960s ranking back
to articles published in the 1950s. In total we collect impact factors of 74 ranked journals in
economics, business and finance for five decades. Table 12 in appendix C provides a table
of the dynamic ranking of the top fourty journals used in this study.
For further analysis we take three further steps: First we consider separately graduates
3The National Research Council rankings of economics graduate programs divide programs into
tiers. The top three tiers include:
• Tier 1 (ranked 1-6): Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford and Yale
• Tier 2 (ranked 7-15): Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, Pennsylvania,
Rochester, California-Berkeley, UCLA, and Wisconsin-Madison
• Tier 3 (ranked 16-30): Illinois-Urbana, Boston University, Brown, Cornell, Duke, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan State, New York University, North Carolina, Texas-Austin, Virginia,
California-San Diego, University of Washington, and Washington University-St. Louis
Source: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/gradstudents/
4Refer to http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html. Note, however, that the rank-
ing on the website is updated continuously and thus is not exactly the same as we use in this
study.
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who publish in one of the ranked journals between year three and year ten after graduation.
In the remainder refer to those as group who “publishes”. The three year requirement is
intended to sort out graduates who just publish their dissertation but do not conduct further
research after the PhD. It turns out that our results are virtually the same if we drop the
requirement (see appendix B.3). Second we build subsamples according to the university
tier. This is done in order to keep the education and research environment as comparable
as possible in the analysis and to compare the effect of our variables of interest on different
groups.
Eventually, we do perform one more manipulation of the data, which is innocuous for our
results, but which is arguably more appealing from an econometric perspective. We group
our graduates’ publication performances and the indicators of whether they publish or not
into university-graduation year averages. This reduces the number of our observations from
13,624 individuals who graduated from tier one, two and three universities between 1955
to 1994 to 1,068 cohort means. The grouping entails no loss of information (because we do
not use any explanatory or control variables that vary below the university-year level) but
the calculation of standard errors becomes significantly easier.5
2.3 Macro Data and Timing
One main aim of our study is to relate the publication success of economists to the state of
the macroeconomy at the point in time when they decide to enter the PhD program, which
we label “at application” in the following.
To impute the application date we subtract the median duration of a PhD from the
graduation date and then use the change in unemployment in the preceding year as an
indicator for the state of the macroeconomy at application. The median duration of a PhD
stayed almost constant with five to six years since the 1970s (see table 1).
For example if a graduate student obtained his doctorate in 2009, he is likely to have
started the program either in August 2003 or August 2004 and must have applied either in
the fall of 2002 or 2003. At this time, the eventual graduate student finishes his undergrad-
uate degree and decides if he should enter the private labor market or not. Because he is
5Angrist and Pischke (2008, 312-315) argue that grouping has advantages from a statistical
perspective because the cohort averages should be close to normally distributed even with modest
group sizes and there is no need for clustering standard errors on the group level anymore.
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*NSF duration data includes masters degress, therefore we subtract 1.5 years
Table 1: Duration of a PhD
a new entrant, the best opportunities for him arise if new jobs are created in the economy.
Consequently we proxy the outside option at application for the student who graduates in
2009 with the change in the unemployment rate from summer 2002 to summer 2003. For
robustness we also use the change in GDP for this period.
One advantage of this approach is that unemployment data is available for a long period
of time. Other potential proxies for the outside option, like job creation numbers and job
openings for university graduates or measures of financial services activity are mostly only
available starting in the 1970s or later.6 As we have only 39 years covered (1955-1994)
shortening the time period to (1970-1994) would result in a loss of 40% of our underlying
data. Furthermore, unemployment change is a continuous variable and therefore more
information is preserved compared to, for example, mere recession indicators.7
Of course, we cannot be sure that the median number of years is a good measure for
the duration of the PhD for the considered graduate.8 In addition, the overall change
in the unemployment rate for the United States might not be the best proxy for the job
opportunities of university graduates. As mentioned above, more specialized indicators are
generally not available for longer time periods.
2.4 Descriptive statistics
In this section we summarize the PhD cohorts’ average productivity, the average probability
to publish and the macroeconomic variation first by graphical exposition and then using
6We are indebted to Paul Oyer for sharing his data on financial services activity.
7We redid our analysis using NBER recession indicators to arrive at the same qualitative results,
however the estimates were not significant.
8There is micro data on the duration available with the National Science Foundation Survey of
earned doctorates but access is limited to on site use.
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(a) performance (b) probability to publish
Figure 1: Research Productivity over Time
summary statistics. The average probability to publish here is simply the probability that
a graduate publishes in between years three and ten after finishing his doctorate.
Panel (a) in figure 1 depicts the average productivity of the PhD cohorts for every year
in our analysis. More specifically, it distinguishes between the average productivity of all
the graduates, of the tier one subsample, and of those graduates that ”publish” among
these two groups. As expected, we see that the performance measures move together to
a substantial degree and that the performance of academics from the elite universities is
highest. Panel (b) in figure 1 graphs the probability to publish for the full sample and the
tier on subsample over the years. Again, the graph for the two groups move together and
the probability of publishing is higher for the tier one graduates.
Table 2 provides further summary statistics of our dependent variables. We see that on
average only 36 percent of the full sample and 44 percent of the tier one subsample publish
in a ranked journal from year three to year ten after graduation (“publish”). Productivity is
expressed in publication points. In order to translate those in terms of articles in a certain
journal, one has to take into account that the importance of journals changes over time.
For example an American Economic Review (AER) article in the 1990s was worth 100
publication points.9 Therefore the average ten year productivity of a university-year cohort
in the full sample is about the equivalent of a third of an AER article in the 1990s. The
average productivity of an economist graduating from a tier 1 university is about double,
i.e. approximately the equivalent of two thirds of an AER article in the 1990s. If we
9Please refer for a more detailed interpretation to appendix C.
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mean sd min max p10 p90 p50
Productivity 33.17 9.09 19.70 57.47 24.96 47.13 30.90
Publish 0.36 0.05 0.23 0.43 0.27 0.41 0.37
Productivity of Publish 93.69 35.29 56.32 179.37 61.74 157.89 80.06
Productivity of Tier 1 62.97 23.50 33.93 139.50 41.97 96.13 54.27
Publish Tier 1 0.46 0.08 0.29 0.60 0.33 0.55 0.48
Productivity of Tier 1 Publish 138.64 60.33 70.12 306.21 84.93 246.64 122.02
Observations 40
Table 2: 10 year Productivity Distribution
Figure 2: Unemployment Change and GDP Growth
only consider economists who do publish, then an economist from tier 1 to 3 universities
publishes about one and a tier 1 economist produces on average 1.4 AER articles in the
1990s.
Finally, the high fraction of graduates that never publish already suggests that research
economists’ productivity is highly skewed with a few “superstars” publishing a multiple of
what the average graduate achieves. Appendix B.2 describes the extent to which this is the
case and uses methods, such as quantile regressions and restricted samples, to check the
accuracy of our results in the main text, which turn out robust.
With respect to our independent variable figure 2 plots the change in the unem-
ployment rate and GDP growth from 1949 to 2004 and table 3 provides descriptive
statistics about these variables at application to the PhD and at graduation for the
cohorts from 1955 to 2004. GDP change and unemployment change move more or
less in lockstep.
10
mean sd min max p10 p90 p50
Unempl Change (Graduation) -0.00 0.97 -2.10 2.90 -0.85 1.30 -0.20
Unempl Change (Application) 0.01 1.11 -2.10 2.90 -1.00 1.80 -0.25
GDP growth (Graduation) 3.40 2.20 -1.94 7.20 -0.22 6.24 3.52
GDP growth (Application) 3.52 2.50 -1.94 8.74 -0.39 6.84 3.66
Observations 50
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Macro-Variables
3 Macroeconomic Conditions and PhD Cohorts’
Average Research Productivity
3.1 Graphical Relationship and Empirical specification
To get an initial sense of the degree to which the macroeconomic conditions at appli-
cation and at graduation are related to the average performance of a cohort, we plot
in figure 3 the average productivity of our full sample over time.
Productivity is compared to the change in unemployment at application and at
graduation on the left- and the right-hand side, respectively. Graph 3(a) shows
that the unemployment rate at application moves quite closely together with our
productivity measure of cohort quality. The relationship of average performance with
unemployment at graduation shown in panel 3(b) seems about equally pronounced.
Hence, by just looking at the graphs of averages, we can see that our conjecture that
productivity differences of cohorts should relate to the business cycle at application
as well as at graduation may have some merit.
We now more formally analyse the relationship between the macroeconomy and
the productivity of the corresponding PhD cohorts. To do this, let qit, the perfor-
mance of a cohort of PhD students from university i who graduate in year t, be
determined by the following equation:
qit = βxt + γyt + controlsit + it (1)
The first regressor xt represents our measure for the macroeconomic situation when
the cohort applied for the PhD while yt represents the same measure at graduation
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(a) At Application (b) At Graduation
Figure 3: Change in Unemployment and Average Research Productivity
from the PhD. In the following, this is mainly the change in the unemployment rate
and, for robustness checks, the growth of GDP.
Furthermore, in each regression we include dummies for the university and the
decade of graduation as well as the full set of interaction terms. The university
dummies adjust for differences in PhD education between universities and the decade
dummies control for different levels of competition and structural changes in the field
of economics over time. This is appropriate because the standards of publication
have changed considerably over time (e.g. Ellison (2002a) and Ellison (2002b)).
In further regressions we also control for linear and quadratic time trends and the
number of graduates per university and year to check for robustness.
3.2 Regression Results
The OLS regression results of estimating our main specification of equation (1) along
with several robustness checks, are displayed in table 4.
Regression (1) is our preferred specification: Here we regress the average academic
productivity of each cohort on unemployment change at application and gradua-
tion. To control for the changing research environment we use university and decade
dummies. In order to have our standard errors reflect the microdata, we weigh the
observations by the number of underlying graduates.10
10This is done because smaller (lower tier) universities with only one or two underlying graduates
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unempl Change 2.281*** 1.656* 2.443*** 4.307* 4.071
(Graduation) (3.15) (1.76) (3.04) (1.97) (1.45)
Unempl Change 1.509** 0.985 1.514** 5.316** 7.703***





Adj. R-Squared 0.515 0.380 0.512 0.514 0.371 0.320
N 1068 1068 1068 1068 234 234
Note: Regressions (1) and (3) are OLS with observations weighted by cohort size. In regression (2)
observations are not weighted by cohort size. In column (4) a linear and quadratic time trend is
added. Regression (5) and (6) restrict the sample to tier 1 weighted and unweighted by cohort
size, respectively. t statistics are in parentheses. *, ** , *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10 % level.
Table 4: Effect of Macroeconomic Conditions on Research Productivity
The second cell in column (1) reports that the coefficient on xt is positive and
significant at the five percent level. More specifically, high unemployment change
at application leads to above average research productivity of the resulting cohort.
Hence, column one provides support for our hypothesis that cohorts who apply during
a recession are on average of higher quality than boom cohorts. We can interpret this
result causally under the assumption that the unemployment change at application
is exogenous to all other factors influencing a cohort’s publication success.
Further, the effect is also of an economically significant magnitude: taking our
linear regression model seriously, a cohort on the 90% quantile of unemployment
change at application is expected to achieve 4.22 publication points more than a
cohort at the 10% quantile. This is around thirteen percent of the average publication
success of 33.17 or the equivalent of one single-authored “Economica” publication in
the 1990s for every economist in the university-year cohort.11
would otherwise obtain the same weight in this regression as observations from the larger (higher
tier) universities with up to 56 graduates in Harvard in the year 1971 (see Angrist and Pischke
(2008, 313-314)).
11Referring to table 3, the difference between the 10 and the 90 percent quantile of unemployment
change in our data is 2.8. Multiplying this by the parameter estimate of 1.509 gives a difference in
average productivity between “boom” and “recession” cohorts of 4.22 publication points. Referring
to table 12, this is about the number of publication points one gets assigned for an article in
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To check this result for robustness we estimate several variants of the model. In
regression (2) we do not weigh the observations according to the underlying number
of graduates. The direction of the effect remains the same, but it is less strong and
the significance disappears. This may be the case because some observations with
only very few underlying graduates receive “undue” weight. In regression (3) we use
GDP change instead of unemployment change as the measure of our macroeconomic
variation. Of course, the sign of the coefficient reverses but the interpretation is
unchanged. Recession cohorts (when unemployment change is high and GDP change
is negative) are significantly better than boom cohorts. In specification (4) a linear
and a quadratic time trend are employed in addition to the decade dummies to
control for potential time trends. The results of this potentially more robust model
are identical to our preferred specification (1).
Regressions (5) and (6) reestimate the model on the subsample of graduates from
tier one universities. Our hypothesized quality effects might be best measured on
this subsample because graduates from lower ranked universities are less likely to
publish in general. Even if there is a quality change of these cohorts when they are
from a recession, we may have a somewhat harder time measuring it because some
of the graduates could be too far below the publication threshold. Graduates from
the leading universities are more likely to be able to publish throughout the whole
business cycle, therefore we can more easily measure variation in publication quality
conditioned on unemployment change.
The results are as expected. The direction and significance for the tier one sub-
sample are the same as in the full sample, but the size of the parameter roughly
quadruples. The economic significance of the effect is also larger. A cohort applying
on the 90% quantile of unemployment change achieves on average 14.8 publication
points more than a cohort applying on the 10% quantile. This is about 24% of their
average of 62.97 publication points and the equivalent of one single-authored “Journal
of Labor Economics” article in the 1990s.12
“Economica” during the 1990s. From table 2, we also find that the “average” PhD graduate achieves
33.17 publication points.
12Note that the last column does not weigh the observations by the underlying number of grad-
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Finally, table 4 also reports the effect of the macroeconomic condition at gradua-
tion on the performance of PhD cohorts. Cohorts graduating in a recession perform
on average better than cohorts graduating in a boom. The effect has the same mag-
nitude as the effect at application and is significant in all but one specification. Its
economic size is also of a similar magnitude as the effect at application: If one com-
pares the cohort that graduated at the 10% quantile of unemployment change with
the cohort at the 90% quantile, then the latter achieves on average 5.13 publication
points more. This is again around 15% of the mean and equivalent to a bit more
than one single-authored “Economica” in the 1990s in terms of articles.
4 Propensity to Publish and Productivity of Those
Who Do
In this section, we separate the positive effect of recessions on the quality of PhD
economists into two components. The propensity publish after graduation and the
productivity conditional on publishing at least one piece.
In the previous section we found that recession cohorts turn out to be more
academically productive on average. At this point, we would like to know, however,
if this is due to the fact that recession researchers are more likely to publish or that
they publish more given that they publish (i.e. extensive versus intensive margin
effects). In general, the likelihood to publish may be driven by two effects. On the
one hand, there may be a quality effect where more able individuals are more likely
to publish. On the other hand, there may be an outside option (or preference) effect
such that members of some cohorts are more likely to choose the academic career
path after the PhD and thus publish.
In the following, we find that, despite appearing more able, recession cohorts at
application have a lower propensity to publish while the macroeconomic conditions
uates. Contrary to the regression in column (2) for the full sample, this does not change much our
results in the tier one subsample because these cohorts are relatively large and do not differ too
much in size. Consequently there are only few small observations that receive undue weight.
15
(a) At Application (b) At Graduation
Figure 4: Change in Unemployment and Propensity to Publish
at graduation have no effect on the likelihood to publish. In section 5 we argue that
the former result may reflect the fact that outside options (in other sectors) have a
stronger influence on whether someone publishes than ability differences. Further, we
will argue that the previous sections’ estimates thus rather constitute a lower bound
for the quality differences between boom and recession cohorts.
4.1 Graphical Relationship and Empirical Specification
Figure 4 depicts the fraction of economists who publish every year together with the
inverse of the change in unemployment at application to the PhD (panel 4(a)) and at
graduation (panel 4(b)). We depict the inverse of the unemployment change in order
to facilitate the visual inspection. Although not as clearly as in the graphs of the last
section, we can see that the fraction of graduates who publish moves together with
negative unemployment change. More graduates from boom cohorts seem to publish.
It is much harder to find any visual relationship between the propensity to publish
and the macroeconomic sitution at graduation.
The empirical specification is the same as in equation 1, except that we substitute
our measure of academic productivity of each university-graduation year cohort by
the fraction pit that publishes in a ranked journal between years three and ten after
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graduation.13
pit = βxt + γyt + controlsit + it (2)
4.2 Regression Results
Table 5 estimates equation 2 for our preferred specification and several other specifi-
cations in oder to check for robustness of the relationship. The regression models in
the different panels are the same as in table 4. Our preferred weighted full sample
model is presented in the first column. It is followed by the non-weighted model, the
model with GDP growth as the proxy for the macroeconomy and the model with
linear and quadratic time trends. Regressions (5) and (6) restrict the sample to tier
one graduates with and without weighing, respectively.
The second cell in column (1) reports that the effect of the unemployment change
at application on the propensity to publish is negative and significant. A one percent
higher unemployment rate is associated with a 1.03 percent lower probability to ever
publish. Cohorts that applied for the PhD during recession are thus significantly less
likely to ever publish than boom cohorts.
In order to get an idea about the size of the effect, consider a cohort on the 10%
quantile of unemployment change at application versus one at the 90% quantile. The
fraction who publish in the former (the boom cohort) is 2.9% higher than in the
latter. This is about 8% of the mean likeliness to publish (see table 2).
The alternative specifications for the full sample regression in columns (2) to (4)
reinforce this interpretation. The mean estimates for the tier one subsample are of
the same magnitude as in the full sample, but the coefficients are not statistically
significant on any common level.
To sum up: although the difference is not large in magnitude, it is statistically
significant and it may reflect the fact that outside options (in other sectors) have a
stronger influence on whether someone publishes than ability differences. Moreover,
13Note that the dependent variable here is bounded between zero and one. Had we not constructed
university-graduation year averages and were we thus to estimate this equation on the underlying
microdata, our specification would be called a linear probability model.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unempl Change 0.00227 -0.000557 0.00275 0.00215 0.00832
(Graduation) (0.54) (-0.10) (0.59) (0.27) (0.87)
Unempl Change -0.0103** -0.0149*** -0.00800* -0.00979 -0.00804





Adj. R-Squared 0.421 0.253 0.421 0.428 0.404 0.284
N 1068 1068 1068 1068 234 234
Note: Regressions (1) and (3) are OLS with observations weighted by cohort size. In regression (2)
observations are not weighted by cohort size. In column (4) a linear and quadratic time trend is
added. Regression (5) and (6) restrict the sample to tier 1 weighted and unweighted by cohort
size, respectively. t statistics are in parentheses. *, ** , *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10 % level.
Table 5: Propensity to become an academic
our estimate for the difference in academic productivity at application from section 3
should thus constitute a lower bound for the underlying academic ability differences
between recession and boom cohorts.
Table 5 also reports the effect of the macroeconomic conditions at graduation on
the fraction of graduates who publish. In none of the different specifications do we
find a significant effect. Further, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates is very
low and their signs are changing over the different specifications.
We conclude that, according to our data, the macroeconomic situation at gradua-
tion has no effect on the propensity to publish. This may seem surprising because one
would expect that during a recession more graduates would try to stay in academia
and thus not only would a recession cohort’s average productivity be higher as in ta-
ble 4, but also the fraction of individuals who publish. In section 5 we show that this
effect may be offset by a lower amount of academic jobs available during recession.
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4.3 Productivity of Those Who Publish
To complete our regression analysis, we examine the productivity of those who do
publish. One should keep in mind that, according to our results so far, those who
publish are not a random selection of each graduating class. Also, we expect that the
effect of macroeconomic conditions at application is even stronger in the “publish”
subsample. The reason is that, although recession cohorts feature a larger fraction
of graduates who don’t publish, their average performance is higher. If we eliminate
those who do not publish, the effect should increase further.
We run regression 1 for the subsample of the graduates who publish. Table 6
reports the results. Both, unemployment change at application and at graduation, are
now highly significant and the parameter estimates for the effect more than double.
If we compare cohorts at the 10% and 90% quantile of unemployment change at
application, the 90% quantile cohort has on average 11 publication points more, which
is about 12% of the mean. This corresponds to a single-authored “Rand Journal of
Economics” publication in the 1990s for every economist in the university-year cohort.
The remaining columns of table 6 reinforce this impression. One interesting thing
to note is that the effect at application is statistically and economically stronger for
the tier 1 subsample. A cohort at the 90% quantile of unemployment change is 34
publication points better than a cohort at the 10% quantile. This is about 25% of the
mean and in publication points it is about a third of a single-authored AER article
in the 1990s.
5 Interpretation and Discussion
We can causally interpret our estimation results from the previous two sections be-
cause the business cycle is arguably exogenous to these microeconomic outcomes.
However, we cannot test our hypothesis of the selection of skills into sectors directly.
In this section we provide ecoomic theory and secondary evidence that we think is
convincing enough to confidently endorse the selection hypothesis.
Section 5.1 shows that the number of spaces in academia is relatively stable over
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unempl Change 4.607*** 3.746* 4.447*** 6.797* 6.909
(Graduation) (2.98) (1.86) (2.59) (1.83) (1.47)
Unempl Change 3.884*** 3.274* 3.522** 12.27*** 18.20***





Adj. R-Squared 0.477 0.409 0.474 0.477 0.422 0.476
N 950 950 950 950 226 226
Note: Regressions (1) and (3) are OLS with observations weighted by cohort size. In regression (2)
observations are not weighted by cohort size. In column (4) a linear and quadratic time trend is
added. Regression (5) and (6) restrict the sample to tier 1 weighted and unweighted by cohort
size, respectively. t statistics are in parentheses. *, ** , *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10 % level.
Table 6: Effect of the Macroeconomy on the Productivity Those Who Publish
the business cycle while the number of people who seek to enter it is countercyclical.
This creates a “better” selection of academic cohorts during recession. Section 5.2
formalizes this notion using a modification of the Roy (1951) model. In section 5.3
we discuss how our paper relates to the well-known article by Paul Oyer (2006).
5.1 The Business Cycle’s Relationship with Application Num-
bers, Program Sizes, and Academic Positions for Grad-
uates
A core channel for our selection hypothesis is the conjecture that more individuals
would like to enter academia (graduate programs or assistant professorships, respec-
tively) in economically bad times. Given that there is a (relatively) stable number of
spaces in academia, the selectivity of academic positions should be higher during re-
cession. Unfortunately, meaningful application numbers or ability measures of entry
cohorts into economics PhD programs (such as average GRE results) are unavailable
to us. The institutions we have contacted requesting such data were not able to
20
provide us with it due to confidentiality reasons.
However, there exists some secondary evidence for our hypothesized channel. In
a recent study, Bedard and Herman (2008) find that male science undergraduates be-
come on average 15% more likely to enrol in a doctoral program if the unemployment
rate rises by 1%. They locate the main effect at the students with a GPD above 3.75,
i.e. the very strongest students of their respective cohorts. This is in line with our
theory at application.
Gallet, List, and Orazem (2005) show for the years 1995 and 1997 that PhDs from
lower ranked institutions search more for business jobs if the job market is weak. At
the same time institutions only hire from the top PhD programs. In a related sector,
Fougere and Pouget (2003) find that the applications per spaces ratio in the French
public sector rises strongly in economically hard times. These pieces of evidence
support our theory at graduation that during weak job markets more individuals
seek employment in academia.
The second component of our selection hypothesis states that the number of spaces
in academia should be relatively stable over the business cycle. Figure 5 plots the
change in unemployment together with the change in the number of entrants into
economics PhD programs and the number of academic jobs listed on the American
Economic Association’s (AEA) website.14 Panel 5(a) suggests that the number of
students admitted to graduate programs in economics is not systematically related
to the business cycle. This impression is confirmed when calculating correlations
between the two variables, which we do not report here.15
In panel 5(b), we see that the number of new jobs offered for economists who
graduate with a PhD is clearly procyclical. More academic jobs are offered in times
when the general unemployment rate falls and vice versa. This result is confirmed by
a more formal statistical analysis (we find that the relationship is highly significant)
and by Oyer (2006) who analyses the same data. This does not necessarily have
14The former data is from the NSF.
15Note that the change in the number of PhD entrants, which is in fact very stable, appears to
be fluctuating a lot in the figure because of the scale of its axis. On average, each program takes on
about 35 students and the yearly deviations from the mean are mostly below 4 students.
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(a) PhD Entry Numbers (NSF Data) (b) AEA Academic Job Listings
Figure 5: Unemployment Change and Change in “Academic Spaces”
to imply that less economists obtain academic positions during recession, as they
might exert increased effort of search and a higher willingness to fill less attractive
positions that may not be filled in good years. Thinking of publishing as an indicator
of whether someone holds an academic position, in our data we find that recession
economists are as likely to publish as boom cohorts. Nonetheless, the data supports
our hypothesis that the competition for academic positions becomes fiercer during
recession.
5.2 A Modified Roy (1951) Model with Quantity Constraints
The above results suggest that the number of positions available in academia does not
increase with higher demand during economically hard times and that they might in
fact decline. Further, more students and PhD graduates seem to be willing to take up
academic positions during recession. Figure 5.2 presents a modification of the well-
known Roy (1951) model of the selection of skills into different sectors into which we
introduce quantity constraints in the academic sector. This modified model is able
to bring together our above findings and the regression results from the main part of
the paper (sections 3 and 4):
Peoples’ skills (or talent) in the population of potential applicants for an eco-
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nomics PhD are distributed in two dimensions - academic and private sector skill.16
During recession, the cutoff line of people who would prefer academia to private sec-
tor employment moves to the right compared to a boom, i.e. additional candidates
would like to do a PhD.17 If, as in the graph, the number of spaces in PhD programs
are the same during recession as during boom and selection committees base their
admission decision on (expected) academic skill, the lowest academic skill that can
still enter the PhD will rise from sboom1 to srecession1 . Also, the average private sector
skill rises from E[sboomo ] to E[srecessiono ]. More generally, the distribution of skills of
recession cohorts will first-order stochastically dominate that of boom cohorts in both
sectors.
The model thus predicts that economists who applied for the PhD during recession
will be of higher academic as well as private sector skill. If, at graduation, the economy
is not in recession anymore and the cutoff line moves to the left, a higher fraction of
them will choose private sector employment than of a boom cohort. Also, because of
their higher ability, they will in general publish more than the members of a boom
cohort. We find both of these predictions hold true in our empirical analysis of the
16For ease of exposition, the distribution of skills is uniform in the graph. However, our predictions
should be robust to any specific distributional assumption.
17The threshold doesn’t have to be a straight line as in the original Roy model where it represents
the relative price for the two tasks. Instead, we only need that it is monotonic and that in a recession
it (weakly) moves to the right.
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effect of the business cycle at application.
Moreover, we can use the model to make predictions about the effect of the busi-
ness cycle at graduation. Now the underlying population is all the economics PhD
graduates in a given year. If the economy is in recession, additional economists, who
would otherwise have chosen private sector employment, will try to find academic em-
ployment. Given that the number of academic positions doesn’t increase (or in fact
decreases), only the best of them will get an academic job. This leads to a more able
cohort of young assistant professors in the respective year and it should be reflected
in more academic output. Our regression results confirm this prediction. Further, as
everyone who graduates from a top 30 university and secures an academic job should
be able to write at least some publications in ranked journals (there are 74 different
ones in our dataset), we do not expect boom or recession cohorts at graduation to
differ much in their likeliness to publish. This is again consistent with our data.
To summarize, we believe that the business cycle drives the selection of skills into
economics PhD programs and into academic versus private sector employment after
graduation. This hypothesis is consistent with our empirical evidence and with a
convincing theory based on the Roy model.
Finally, note that if we run a standard Heckman selection regression (1976) on data
generated by a model with quantity constraints in one sector as in figure 5.2, we will
virtually always obtain a positive estimate for the correlation between the two skills.
This is the case because, under quantity constraints, individuals of higher skills in
both sectors replace individuals of lower skills systematically with the business cycle.
We have run such a misspecified Heckman regression on our data and, unsurprisingly,
obtained a positive correlation between the two skills.
5.3 Comparison to Paul Oyer’s (2006) Paper
Before we conclude, we should more explicitly relate our study to the well-known pa-
per by Paul Oyer (2006) which inspired our work. Oyer studies how their initial aca-
demic placement affects economics PhDs’ long term outcomes, including publication
success. Because an economist’s first placement is strongly affected by his unobserved
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ability, Oyer instruments it using the rate of unemployment or the number of AEA
job listings in the respective year. This identification strategy is sensible because the
first stage estimates show that initial job placement is significantly correlated with
the state of the macroeconomy, i.e. negatively correlated with the unemployment
rate.
Given the results of our paper, however, Oyer’s instrument should be correlated
with the expected ability of individuals who decide to pursue academic jobs. We
found that, during recession, more academically able individuals select themselves
into the academic career than during a boom. Therefore, Oyer’s parameter estimates
for the impact of the first placement on academic productivity should be downward
biased and in fact his effect should be stronger. Indeed, they do not turn out robustly
positive and significant in his paper (see table 6 in Oyer (2006)). By the same token,
our estimates of the unemployment rate’s impact at graduation on productivity in
table 4 may constitute a lower bound of the difference in academic skill between boom
and recession cohorts.18
More generally, there is a conceptual difference between the focus of the two pa-
pers. Oyer exploits how the favorability of the selection into institutions, which are
(vertically) ranked, changes with the business cycle. We study how individuals (hor-
izontally) select themselves into sectors depending to the macroeconomic conditions.
Oyer focuses on the changes in demand for economists while we focus on the supply
decision by economists over the cycle.
6 Conclusion and Implications
This paper has investigated the effect of adverse labor market conditions at applica-
tion on the long term research productivity of economics PhDs in the United States.
We have also studied the effect on PhDs’ probability to publish and the effect of the
macroeconomy at graduation. We find that recession cohorts at application as well
18This is the case because, according to Oyer’s study, boom cohorts have the advantage of (rela-
tively) better initial academic placements and their effect on publications.
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as at graduation publish significantly better than boom cohorts, but that those who
apply in a recession are less likely to publish at all. Our results suggest that the
quality of skills selected into academia varies with the business cycle and thus with
the relative attractiveness of the private sector versus academia.
Given the severity of last year’s financial crisis and the large extent to which people
flooded graduate schools with applications in response, our paper suggests that an
exceptionally able selection of students may graduate from these cohorts. Further,
we provide a rationale for countercyclical funding of education by the government
that goes beyond mitigating the adverse impact of recessions on individuals. If it
is the aim of the government to get more high-ability individuals into science and
academia, it may in fact be efficient to specifically target recession cohorts with extra
funding and to provide additional spaces in graduate programs for them.
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Appendices
A Automated Data Processing
In a first step we downloaded the PDF version of all issues of the American Economics
Associations (AEA) yearly “List of Doctoral Dissertations in Economics”.
To convert the PDF version of the AEA doctoral list (available at JStor) to a
computer readable format we used the OCR programs included in the Adobe Acrobat
Professional Suite. We also tried several other programs, but the quality was best
with the Adobe technology. This procedure worked very well in general and made the
compilation of the dataset much faster but, as with every automated procedure, it
also entailed several problems and was sometimes imperfect. The original PDFs were
in some cases scans of old printed versions and therefore the character recognition was
imperfect for some records, due to the quality of the source files. Particularly, there
were problems with the letter "r", which was from time to time mistaken as "n" or "i".
"O" was sometimes read as zero, "H" as "II", and "M" as "IVI". Also, dots were not
readily recognized. We were able to correct faulty university names and graduation
years, because the set of those is finite. For example we always replaced "IVIichigan"’
with "Michigan". Because of limited resources we were not able to correct all errors
in the name spellings. We decided to drop the observations with names that contain
characters or sequences of characters that are highly unlikely to be correct and thus
had no chance to return accurate results in a query for publications in Jstor.
In a next step we used regular expressions, a way to assign database fields for
some string combinations, to convert the ASCII files in a database format. The data
structure of the AEA doctoral list is quite regular so this procedure worked reasonably
well. On some instances, the program was not able to determine the end of a data
entry due to missing dots or other OCR errors. The program then searched for the
next end of a data entry and therefore at least two data points were lost.
In a third step we used a Java program to match each record with its publi-
cation record in Jstor. To do this we used the newly available XML Application
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Programming Interface of Jstor, called “Data for Research”. Specifically, we entered
the names and given names of all researchers contained in our database and extracted
all recorded publications with journal title, page count and the number and identity
of coauthors in the 10 years after their graduation. To be as specific as possible, we
restricted our search to articles classfied as “research articles” published in English
language in the fields of economics, business and finance. A problem which occurred
when we matched the graduates in our database with the JStor publication data, was
that there are several economists who share the same name. If possible we then relied
on a second name to identify the correct author and restricted our publication sample
to 10 years after graduation. Unfortunately, using the second name did not always
solve the problem: Paul Robin Krugman published his first papers as Paul R. Krug-
man because apparently there was another economist called Paul Krugman. Later
Paul Robin Krugman dropped the “R”. With our methodology we would have two
different records, one for Paul R. Krugman and one for Paul Krugman with the lat-
ter being attributed all later work of the Nobel prize winning economist. Sometimes
conditioning on the decade following graduation helped to ameliorate this problem.
If neither the second name nor the time period gave us an idea which author deserved
a given the publication, we randomly assigned it.
We believe that all these errors are orthogonal to our effect of interest and that
they thus just add noise to our data. An exception would be if the number of PhD
students with a hard-to-read-in name varies with the business cycle. This seems
rather unlikely to us (unless the fraction of foreigners with hard-to-read-in names is
affected by the macroeconomy). Nethertheless we want to test how many read-in
names are faulty: To do this, we first correct some years perfectly by hand and com-
pare the resulting “complete” graduation numbers to data from the National Science
Foundation (NSF). We find that the “complete” graduation numbers from the AEA
list are about 90% of the NSF graduation numbers. Then, for every year, we compare
the fraction of the “not corrected” number in our database to the number in the NSF
data. This fraction fluctuates from 0.6 to 0.9, which suggests that in the worst case
we lose about 40% of graduates due to the imperfect automated reading-in proce-
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dure. We do not know how many articles we wrongly assign to economists because
they share the same given and second name. Here the error is also orthorgonal, if
parents do not systematically start to name their children after famous economists
in recessions. Despite the recent popularity of economics this seems unlikely to us.
B Robustness
In this part of the appendix, we analyze the robustness of our results. We first show
in section B.1 that our aggregation procedure to university-year level is innocuous
for our results, but simplifys the test theory. Next we consider the effect of academic
superstars on our results (section B.2). For section B.1 and B.2 we abstain from
grouping the data on the university-year level as we do in the main text. In the last
part of the robustness section we consider different measures of academic success.
B.1 Regressions on the Individual Graduate Level
In the main text we group the observation according to university and year. The
reason is, that the group means are approximately normally distributed (Angrist and
Pischke (2008)) and therefore the test theory is much simpler. Once we consider
each individual graduate separately, we have to decide how to adjust the standard
errors in order to draw correct inference. Table 7 reports our regression of macroe-
conomic variation on graduates’ publication success using clustered, non-adjusted,
bootstrapped, and robust standard errors. The last column displays a regression on
the probability to publish with standard errors clustered on the university-graduation
year level. This table shows, that our results are robust to the different methods of
estimating standard errors. The significance of the coefficients is virtually the same
as for the respective grouped regressions in the main text.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unempl Ch. (Grad) 2.281*** 2.281*** 2.281*** 2.281*** 0.00227
(3.19) (3.26) (3.22) (3.06) (0.59)
Unempl Ch. (Appl) 1.509** 1.509** 1.509** 1.509** -0.0103***
(2.25) (2.24) (2.25) (2.05) (-2.75)
GDP growth (Grad) -0.711**
(-2.02)
GDP growth (Appl) -0.641**
(-2.14)
Adj. R-Squared 0.0825 0.0821 0.0825 0.0825 0.0825 0.0596
N 13624 13624 13624 13624 13624 13624
Note: Regressions (1),(3),(4) and (5) correspond to column one in table 4 and (2) corresponds to
column (3) in this table. In (1) and (2) standard errors are clustered on the university-graduation
year level, in (3) they are not adjusted, in (4) they are bootstrapped using 50 iterations and in (5)
they are robust. Column (6) corresponds to column (1) in table 4 with the probability to publish
as the dependent variable. Standard errors are again clustered on the university-graduation year
level. t statistics are in parentheses. *, ** , *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % level.
Table 7: Regressions on the individual (non-grouped) level
B.2 Academia: A Superstars Market
The publication success of academic economists is highly skewed with a few super-
stars producing a multiple of the quality-adjusted output of the “average” economist.
Moreover, about 64 percent of Ph.D. graduates never publish according to our data.
Figures 6(b) and 6(c) provide two plots of the distribution of publication success of
academics in our data.
In table 8 we use regressions on increasingly restricted subsamples to shed light
on the influence of such superstars on our results. We only analyze in the following
only academics, to ensure consistency.
The first column reports the results from a regression of academics’ publication
success on unemployment change at application and at graduation with standard er-
rors clustered on the university-graduation year level. The following columns restricts
the sample to academics who publish below 750, 500, 250, and 50 points, respectively.
Hence it sequentially removes those individuals or observations that one might call
“superstars” or “outliers” and checks how much of our results is driven by them.
32
(b) (c)
Figure 6: 10year Productivity Distribution
The effect of our macroeconomic variables on average publication success decreases
monotonically as expected. The significance of our effect also declines, but it remains
significant at the 5% level. The significance remains, even if we restrict our sample to
academics who publish below 50 points, which is between the average and the median
of publication success (83 and 39, respectively) in the sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unempl Ch. (Grad) 3.890*** 3.826*** 3.668*** 1.283* 0.411*
(2.68) (2.98) (3.40) (1.83) (1.89)
Unempl Ch. (Appl) 5.121*** 3.593** 3.112*** 1.357* 0.531**
(3.28) (2.56) (2.63) (1.73) (2.18)
Adj. R-Squared 0.136 0.135 0.126 0.0972 0.0640
N 5198 5176 5109 4752 2873
Note: All the columns report regressions of academics’ publication success on unemployment
change at application and at graduation with standard errors clustered on the university -
graduation year level. Columns (2) to (5) restrict the sample to academics who publish below 750,
500, 250, and 50 points, respectively. t statistics are in parentheses. *, ** , *** indicates
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % level.
Table 8: Regressions on increasingly restricted subsamples
Table 9 adds quantile regressions to this analysis. Clustering of standard errors is
problematic in quantile regressions and is not implemented in our version of STATA.
Further, if we control for full graduation decade and university effects as well as their
interaction terms, the degrees of freedom are reduced significantly and the implemen-
tation in STATA breaks down.
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Therefore we only control for university tier, graduation decade and their full
interactions and we do not adjust the standard errors in these regressions. Column
(1) of table 9 provides the baseline regression to the mean whereas the remaining
columns provide regressions to the 25, 50, 75, and 95 percentile of the distribution
of publication success, repectively. Again, we see that the effect of our macroeco-
nomic variables is more pronounced for higher quantiles. The effect is significant on
conventional levels for all quantiles.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unempl Ch. (Grad) 3.337** 0.691** 2.325*** 4.498** 6.833
(2.12) (2.10) (2.58) (2.08) (1.01)
Unempl Ch. (Appl) 5.782*** 0.621* 1.630* 7.687*** 17.36**
(3.60) (1.90) (1.78) (3.51) (2.53)
Adj. R-Squared 0.121
N 5198 5198 5198 5198 5198
Note: Column one provides the baseline regression to the mean with graduation decade, university
tier and full interactions as controls. Standard errors are not clustered. Columns (2) to (5) report
regressions to the 25, 50, 75, and 95 percentile of the distribution of publication success. t
statistics are in parentheses. *, ** , *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % level.
Table 9: Quantile regressions
We conclude that, while some of our results are driven by exceptional individuals
who started their Ph.D. during recessions, there is a clear and significant effect on all
quantiles of the distribution of academics’ publication success.
B.3 Alternative Outcome Measures
In this section we use different measures of researchers’ productivity and likelihood
to publish to check for the robustness of our results. Table 10 reports results of our
standard regression from table 4 for different alternative measures of a researcher’s
productivity. In Columns (1) and (4) we use our preferred dynamic journal ranking
for tier 1 to 3 universities and the tier 1 subsample, respectively. In columns (2) and
(5) we use the h-index to weigh the impact of different publications. The h-index is a
recently developed index which attempts to measure both the scientific productivity
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and the apparent scientific impact of a journal.19 Columns (3) and (6) use the simple
count of the number of publications in the (arguable) six top journals.20
The parameter estimates for the different measures cannot be compared directly
because of the different scales of the productivity measures (most notably for the
count of top journal articles). In terms of direction and significance our effect is
persistent. Please note, that the two alternative measures have important problems.
The h-index is not dynamic and ignores the changeing importance of journals over
time. The top journal measure ignores all but the six top journals and it doesn’t
account for (changes in) the relative importance of these journals over time.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unempl Ch. (Grad) 2.281*** 3.934*** 0.0333*** 4.307* 7.042** 0.0630***
(3.15) (3.79) (4.06) (1.97) (2.28) (2.60)
Unempl Ch. (Appl) 1.509** 1.127 0.0133* 5.316** 5.602* 0.0589**
(2.16) (1.13) (1.68) (2.53) (1.90) (2.54)
Adj. R-Squared 0.515 0.511 0.496 0.371 0.317 0.317
N 1068 1068 1068 234 234 234
Note: Columns (1) and (4) repeat the results using our preferred dynamic journal ranking for all
the tier 1-3 universities and the tier 1 subsample, respectively. In columns (2) and (5) we use the
h-index to weigh different publications’ impact. Columns (3) and (6) use the simple count of the
number of publications in the "The Quarterly Journal of Economics", "The Journal of Political
Economy", "The American Economic Review", "The Review of Economic Studies", "Econometrica",
and "The Journal of Finance". t statistics are in parentheses. *, ** , *** indicates significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10 % level.
Table 10: Alternative productivity measures
Table 11 reproduces table 5 from the main text without the three year requirement
in the “publish” measure. The unemployment rate at application has the same impact
on the likelihood to publish if we count all publications or only the publications three
years after graduation. In any case, the unemployment rate at graduation is again
not significantly related to the “publish” variable. Overall, our results are robust to
dropping the three year requirement.
19Refer to the IDEAS RePEc website: http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.hindex.html
20The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The Journal of Political Economy, The American Eco-
nomic Review, The Review of Economic Studies, Econometrica, and The Journal of Finance
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unempl Ch. (Grad) 0.00437 0.00354 0.00418 0.00539 0.0184*
(1.01) (0.59) (0.87) (0.66) (1.89)
Unempl Ch. (Appl) -0.0101** -0.0142** -0.00833** -0.0131* -0.0129
(-2.42) (-2.49) (-1.97) (-1.66) (-1.43)
GDP growth (Grad) 0.000357
(0.18)
GDP growth (Appl) 0.00463**
(2.45)
Adj. R-Squared 0.407 0.237 0.406 0.410 0.393 0.265
N 1068 1068 1068 1068 234 234
Note: Regression (1) and (3) is OLS with observations weighted by cohort size. In regression (2)
observation are not weighted by cohort size. In column (4) a linear and quadratic time trend is
added. Regression (5) and (6) restricts the sample to Tier 1 weighted and unweighted by cohort
size respectively. t statistics are in parentheses. *, ** , *** indicates significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
Table 11: Effect of macro conditions without 3 years requirement
C Interpretation of publication points
Throughout this paper, the outcome measure is denominated in publication points.
To interpret these points, please refer to table 12 which shows the points awarded for
an article in a certain journal from 1960 onwards. The best journal in each decade
receives 100 points and all others are scaled accordingly. We use for every decade a
different ranking because the importance of a journal changes over time. For example,
an single-authored "Econometrica" Article in 1960 was worth 46.6 points in the 1960s
and 96.8 points in 1990. The impact of the "American Economic Review" changed
even more dramatically: In the 1960s and in the 1990s it was a leading journal with
93.3 and 100 respectively. In contrast, in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s it is only a top
tier journal with 30-40 publication points. Consequently it is not straightforward to
interpret our results above e.g. in "article in American Economic Review" equivalents,
but only in articles in "article in American Economic Review in the 1990s" equivalents.
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Rank Journal (ordered by 2000 rank) 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 65.6 16.2 41.6 58.1 100
2 Econometrica 46.6 31.6 78.4 96.8 68.7
3 Journal of Economic Literature - 100 100 18.8 63.5
4 The Review of Economic Studies 100 30.7 40.7 45.2 54.3
5 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity - 96.9 15.9 0.7 51.5
6 The Journal of Political Economy 63.5 59.1 63 65.2 49.8
7 Economic Policy - - - - 45.7
8 Journal of Labor Economics - - 15.4 12.8 45.5
9 The American Economic Review 93.3 34.5 40.2 100 39.9
10 The Journal of Economic Perspectives - - 23.3 34.3 39.8
11 The Review of Financial Studies - - - - 39.2
12 Journal of the European Economic Association - - - - 38.6
13 The RAND Journal of Economics (Bell Journal
of Economics)
- 39.5 40.2 11.4 38.2
14 The Journal of Finance 37.8 14.6 34.1 34.1 31.1
15 The Review of Economics and Statistics 59.8 12.4 6.5 28 21.7
16 Journal of Business & Economic Statistics - - 7.9 38.4 20.8
17 The Economic Journal 47.5 28 23.9 20.7 20.5
18 Journal of Applied Econometrics - - - 16.6 19.1
19 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 18.5 22.1 18.6 18.6
20 The World Bank Economic Review - - - 5.7 18.5
21 International Economic Review 35.1 19 12.3 23 18.4
22 IMF Staff Papers - - - 5.1 18.3
23 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization - - - 4.1 16.1
24 Journal of Law and Economics 51.8 43.3 33.1 3.9 14.1
25 The Journal of Human Resources - 13.6 4.6 21.3 13.4
26 Journal of Population Economics - - - 2.41 10.6
27 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2.5 7.1 2.1 10.7 9.2
28 The Journal of Business 18.5 37.4 8.7 8.7
29 The Journal of Industrial Economics 14.9 16.4 16 3.85 8.7
30 The World Bank Research Observer - - - 0.9 8.5
31 The Journal of Financial and Quant. Analysis - 10.8 20 2.1 7.9
32 Oxford Economic Papers 35.2 16.8 25 3.7 7.9
33 Economica 20.7 36.2 4.1 4.5 7.2
34 Economic Theory - - - 22.4 6.8
35 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 17 18.8 23.4 - 6.1
36 Econometric Theory - - 3.3 45.8 5.9
37 The Canadian Journal of Economics - 11.8 10.2 5.09 5.6
38 The Journal of Legal Studies - - 51.6 5.4 5.4
39 Financial Management - - - - 5.1
40 Journal of Accounting Research - - - - 4.2
Note: These are the first 40 out of 74 journals. The ranking of 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 are taken
from Laband and Piette (1994). For the 2000s, we normalize current discounted recursive impact
factors ranking from the IDEAS RePEc website to make it comparable to the other rankings.
Table 12: Ranking of journals in different decades.
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